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1. INTRODUCTION
Corporate income tax (CIT) incidence is an important and contentious issue in tax 
policy discussions. Much of the focus in the recent literature and in policy discussions 
concerns the allocation of the burden of the CIT between owners of capital and labour. 
Since income from capital tends to be concentrated with wealthier individuals, if the 
burden of the CIT falls largely on capital it increases the tax system’s progressivity. 
On the other hand, if the tax is borne mostly by labour through lower wages, the 
CIT is less progressive. Despite the importance of this issue in policy discussions, 
empirical evidence is quite limited and the results are mixed; there is a particular 
dearth of empirical research on the incidence of corporate taxes in a Canadian setting.
According to theoretical open economy general equilibrium models, the burden of the 
CIT may partly, and possibly largely, fall on labour. In these models, an increase in 
the CIT reduces the return to capital, causing capital to leave the jurisdiction, which 
lowers the marginal product of labour and ultimately wages. Thus, the CIT can have 
a negative indirect effect on wages through its impact on labour productivity by way 
of its impact on capital. However, the magnitude of this effect depends critically on 
several modelling assumptions and parameter values related to the size of the country, 
the degree of capital mobility, the nature of competition in the output market, etc.
An emerging empirical literature investigates the effects of CIT on wages by way of 
this indirect transmission mechanism. Empirical studies in this vein include Hassett 
and Mathur (2006, 2015) for a cross-section of countries; Desai, Foley and Hines 
(2007) and Felix (2007, 2009) for the U.S. They all find evidence in support of the 
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1relevance of the indirect channel using national aggregate data. Other studies, such as 
Carroll (2009) and Felix (2009) for the U.S., examine corporate tax incidence at the sub-
national level, and find that a substantial amount of the burden of the CIT falls on workers. 
However, a recent study by Clausing (2013) using OECD data casts some doubt on the 
relevance of the indirect channel and the empirical results of some of the above studies.
Another strand of research has focused on an alternative channel whereby the CIT affects 
wages directly. In these models, firms earn economic rents due to imperfect competition 
and/or other market frictions. Firms and workers bargain over these rents, allowing workers 
to earn a premium over the value of their marginal product. If firms earn economic rents 
and bargain with workers over their distribution, then an increase in the corporate tax can 
affect wages directly by lowering the rents available for distribution. Again, the theoretical 
results can be sensitive to various modelling assumptions and the emphasis has been on 
empirically identifying the so-called direct effect. Studies in this vein include Felix and 
Hines (2009) for the U.S., Dwenger et al., (2011) and Fuest et al., (2015) for Germany and 
Arulampalam et al., (2012) for a cross-section of European countries. They tend to find 
some empirical support for the direct transmission mechanism, though estimates of the size 
of the effect vary.
In this paper, we undertake one of the few empirical investigations of the incidence of the 
CIT on wages using Canadian data. We focus on the indirect transmission mechanism of 
corporate taxes on wages. To this end, we estimate wage and capital/labour ratio equations 
simultaneously, using a panel of provincial data from 1981 to 2014. In our most preferred 
specification, we estimate that the elasticity of the real hourly wage rate with respect to 
the statutory CIT rate at the provincial level is -0.107; thus, a one per cent increase in the 
provincial corporate income tax rate is associated with a 0.107 per cent reduction in the real 
hourly wage rate. 
A common approach to assessing the impact of an increase in the CIT on wages is to 
calculate the impact on aggregate wages of raising one more dollar in corporate tax 
revenue. We use this approach to calculate the incidence of the CIT in Canada’s 10 
provinces implied by our elasticity estimate. Under the commonly employed assumption 
that the CIT base is insensitive to changes in the tax rate, our estimates suggest that a $1 
increase in corporate tax revenues due to an increase in the provincial statutory CIT rate 
reduces aggregate wages by from 95 Canadian cents in Newfoundland and Labrador to 
C$1.74 in New Brunswick. In an innovation to this approach, when we account for the 
fact that the CIT base shrinks in response to an increase in the tax rate, our estimates are 
significantly higher, ranging from C$1.52 for Alberta to C$3.85 for Prince Edward Island. 
Our results provide empirical support in a Canadian setting for the indirect transmission 
mechanism highlighted in the open economy general equilibrium models of corporate 
tax incidence and suggest that workers bear a significant part of the corporate income tax 
liability in the form of lower wages. The empirical results are robust to various sensitivity 
checks and are within the range of values obtained in previous similar studies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide a brief 
overview of the literature on the incidence of the CIT. In section 3, we specify the empirical 
model and discuss the data. The empirical results are presented and discussed in section 4. 
Section 5 concludes.
22. LITERATURE REVIEW
Until relatively recently, research into the incidence of the CIT has been largely theoretical 
in nature. Harberger (1962) is often cited as the seminal paper in this regard. He 
investigated the incidence of the CIT in a closed economy general equilibrium setting. His 
analysis indicates that while, in principle, the incidence of the CIT could fall on either or 
both of capital and labour, plausible estimates of key parameters for the U.S. suggest that 
most of the CIT’s burden falls on capital. 
The insight that, under reasonable conditions, capital bears the bulk of this burden hinges 
critically on the assumption of a closed economy. More relevant for Canada and many 
countries has been the extension of general equilibrium models into an open-economy 
setting, which allows for the flow of goods and capital among jurisdictions. Extensions into 
an open-economy setting suggest that labour may bear a larger share of the corporate tax 
burden (see for example, Harberger (1995, 2008), Grubert and Mutti (1985), Gravelle and 
Smetters (2006), Randolph (2006)), though there is some disagreement on the magnitude 
of that share. Gravelle (2013) provides a review of open economy general equilibrium 
incidence models, and concludes that the results hinge critically on key parameter values 
related to the degree of capital mobility, the competitiveness of the output market, the 
country’s size, capital intensity and the substitutability of labour for capital, etc.
Although the theoretical simulation studies identify some of the key mechanisms by which 
the burden of the CIT may be transmitted to labour through lower wages, their policy 
relevance is perhaps limited by the inevitable underlying theoretical ambiguities and 
uncertainty over key parameter values. This has spawned a nascent empirical literature 
investigating the impact of corporate taxes on wages. 
Hassett and Mathur (2006) conducted one of the first empirical studies of the CIT’s impact 
on wages using panel data for OECD countries. Their results suggest that a one per cent 
increase in the statutory corporate income tax rate leads to a decrease in average wages 
of about 0.95 per cent across different specifications in the long term. This paper received 
considerable attention and has spawned some criticism. Gravelle and Hungerford (2008), for 
example, question both the robustness of their results and the plausibility of the magnitude 
of the estimates. In an updated study, Hassett and Mathur (2015) expand their analysis to 
include spatial effects, in particular controlling for tax rates in neighbouring countries. 
When controlling for spatial effects, they find that the impact of corporate taxes on wages 
is somewhat lower, but still very high, with a one per cent increase in the statutory tax rate 
leading to a decrease in wages of about 0.5 per cent. Although Hassett and Mathur (2015) 
do not explicitly identify the mechanism through which corporate taxes affect wages, their 
results are consistent with the indirect effect — corporate taxes lower the capital/labour 
ratio, which in turn lowers wages.
Desai, Foley and Hines (2007) also investigate the indirect transmission mechanism using 
panel data on the foreign activities of U.S. multinationals. They explicitly examine the share 
of the corporate tax distributed between labour and capital, imposing the restriction that the 
shares add to one. Their estimates suggest that labour bears between 45 per cent and 75 per 
cent of the burden of corporate taxes levied on U.S. multinationals.
3Carroll (2009) uses aggregate data from U.S. states from 1970 to 2007 to analyze the effect 
of CIT on wages at a sub-national level. He includes fixed and time effects, and controls 
for the degree of unionization and right-to-work laws, as well as various demographic 
factors. He generally finds a statistically significant effect of corporate taxes on the average 
real hourly earnings for production workers. In particular, a one per cent increase in the 
average state and local tax rate lowers real wages by 0.014 per cent. Using this estimate, he 
calculates that a $1 increase in state and local corporate tax revenue results in a reduction in 
aggregate wages of roughly $2.50.
Felix (2007) uses household survey data on wages for 30 countries from 1979 to 2002. 
This allows her to investigate the impact of corporate taxes on individuals in different 
skill groups. She finds that a one percentage point increase in the marginal corporate tax 
rate reduces wages by 0.7 per cent, and that those reductions are shared relatively equally 
across skill groups. This is a perhaps implausibly large effect, suggesting that the decrease 
in wages is more than four times the amount of corporate tax revenue collected. In a related 
study, Felix (2009) employs individual data at the U.S. state level for the period 1977-2005. 
She regresses wages on state-level corporate taxes. She finds that a one percentage point 
increase in the state marginal corporate tax rate reduces wages from 0.14 to 0.36 per cent.
Clausing (2013) takes a similar approach to Hassett and Mathur (2006, 2015), focusing on 
identifying the indirect channel by way of the capital/labour ratio. Using data on OECD 
countries from 1981 to 2009, she takes a two-stage approach, first regressing the capital/
labour ratio on various CIT measures (and controls), and then regressing wages on the 
capital/labour ratio (and controls). In the first-stage regressions relating the capital/labour 
ratio to the CIT, she finds no impact — the tax coefficients are statistically indistinguishable 
from zero. While she does find that the capital/labour ratio is positively correlated with 
higher wages in the second-stage regression, the lack of association between higher taxes 
and capital in the first stage causes her to question the indirect transmission mechanism 
identified in the open economy general equilibrium models.
More recently, studies such as Felix and Hines (2009), Riedel (2011), Arulampalam et al., 
(2012), Liu and Altshuler (2013) and Fuest et al., (2015) investigate an alternative channel 
whereby the CIT can affect wages directly. In these models, firms earn economic rents due 
to imperfect competition and/or other market frictions, and firms and workers bargain over 
these rents. The CIT reduces the rents available for distribution and can lead directly to a 
reduction in wages. 
Felix and Hines (2009) investigate the impact of U.S. state-level corporate taxes on the union 
wage premium. They undertake a cross-sectional analysis on data from 2000, using state-level 
variation in wages, corporate taxes and the difference between union and non-union wages. 
Thus, they identify the CIT’s direct effect by way of the union wage premium. Controlling 
for observable worker characteristics, they find that a one per cent lower state corporate tax 
rate is associated with a 0.36 per cent higher union wage premium. This suggests that a fully 
unionized firm captures roughly 54 per cent of the benefits of lower tax rates. 
Arulampalam et al., (2012) employ micro firm-level data from nine European countries 
from 1999 to 2003, exploiting both within-firm and cross-firm variation in corporate 
taxation. Their specifications include firm- and time-fixed effects and incorporate dynamics 
via adjustment lags. As they control for firm value added (and therefore, indirectly, 
4investment) their estimates can be viewed as identifying the direct effect of corporate 
taxes on wages. Their preferred estimate of the long-term elasticity of the direct effect on 
wages with respect to the corporate tax rate is -0.093. They calculate that a $1 increase in 
corporate taxes would reduce aggregate wages by 49 cents. 
Liu and Altshuler (2013) also estimate a model of corporate income tax incidence at the 
U.S. state level. They allow for imperfect competition, which generates economic rents 
that can be shared between the firm and workers; they thus emphasize the direct channel 
and control for industry concentration ratios. They use data on individual workers matched 
with industry- and state-specific marginal effective tax rates and concentration ratios. They 
estimate a mean elasticity of wages with respect to the industry marginal effective tax rate 
of about -0.03. This translates into a 60-cent reduction in aggregate wages associated with a 
$1 increase in corporate tax liability. 
Dwenger et al., (2011) use industry- and region-level data in Germany to identify the direct 
effect of corporate taxes. They use average tax rates (the average share of pre-tax profits 
paid in taxes), which they instrument for using calculations from a micro-simulation model. 
Another innovation in their study is to account for employment effects, which they find 
lower the impact of the corporate tax on wages. Nonetheless, they find that corporate taxes 
reduce wages, though by a relatively small amount: a €1 increase in corporate taxes lowers 
aggregate wages by 44 Eurocents. 
Fuest et al., (2015) also focus on the direct effect using firm-level data for German 
municipalities, which have local autonomy with respect to setting local business tax rates. 
They employ an event study/difference-in-differences approach using 18,000 tax reforms 
over a 20-year period. Their results suggest that labour bears between 40 per cent to 50 
per cent of the burden of corporate taxes. They also investigate the importance of various 
institutional features. For example, they find that wage responses are more negative for 
firms under collective bargaining agreements.
In a recent working paper aus dem Moore (2016) investigates the direct transmission 
mechanism using firm level data on companies in France and England. He estimates that 
in the long run a €1 increase in corporate taxes in France lowers aggregate wages in the 
manufacturing sector by 66 Eurocents; for England his results suggest an incidence of 77 
pence. He also investigates various sources of firm-level heterogeneity on incidence, such 
as differences in firm size, average level of profitability, the degree of competition, and the 
sector firms operate in. 
Ebrahimi and Vaillancourt (2016) use Canadian household data from 1998 to 2013 to 
examine the effects of corporate income taxes and payroll taxes on wages. They control for 
various individual characteristics as well as provincial fixed and time effects. They find that 
corporate taxes have an impact on wages even in the very short term, with a one per cent 
increase in the CIT rate reducing real wages by between 0.15 and 0.24 per cent.
On the whole, our reading of the emerging empirical research and the theoretical literature 
that underlies it, suggests that the evidence is building that some, and perhaps a great 
deal, of the burden of the CIT is borne by labour in the form of lower wages, both directly 
and indirectly, particularly in small open economies. However, the empirical research is 
relatively new, there is considerable variation in the estimates and studies using data from 
other jurisdictions are lacking.
5Canada provides a useful laboratory in this regard because it is a prototypical small open 
economy and capital is very mobile both internationally and interprovincially (see Helliwell 
and McKitrick (1999), Bayoumi and Klein (1997) and Gouëdard and Vaillancourt (2011)). 
Moreover, Canadian provinces share common institutional characteristics and are subject to 
a common interest and exchange rate regime.
3. EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION AND DATA
3.1. Theoretical Framework
In this section, we present a very simple model to illustrate the basic idea behind the 
indirect channel through which the CIT may be passed on to labour in an open economy, 
which will motivate our empirical approach. Consider a small open economy where output 
and capital are perfectly mobile interjurisdictionally, labour is immobile, and output and 
factor markets are perfectly competitive. The profits of the representative firm in the small 
open economy are:
 Π = F(K,L) – wL – rK – T  (1)
where F(K,L) is the production function, K the amount of capital, L the amount of labour, w is 
the wage rate, r is the net-of-tax user cost of capital. Corporate income taxes, T, are given by:
 T = t[F(K,L) – wL – αrK] (2)
where t is the statutory CIT rate. Labour costs (wL) are fully deductible for tax purposes, 
while a portion α≥0 of capital costs (rK) are deductible; this is intended to capture, in a 
highly stylized manner, features of many corporate tax systems. In principle, α can be less 
than or greater than one. The typical case would be α<1, in which case the full costs of 
capital are not deductible. This may be the case, for example, due to the non-deductibility 
of the opportunity cost of equity finance and/or the less than full deduction of the economic 
costs of depreciation. However, α>1 can occur if the tax system subsidizes capital, for 
example due to accelerated depreciation, investment allowances, investment tax credits, etc. 
If α=1, the full opportunity cost of capital is deducted for corporate tax purposes and the 
corporate tax is a tax on economic profits or rents.
Substituting (2) into (1), profit maximization requires choosing capital and labour such that 
dΠ/dK=0 and dΠ/dL=0, which gives the first-order conditions:
 FK = r(1-αt)/(1-t) (3)
 FL = w (4)
where FK is the marginal product of capital and FL is the marginal product of labour. 
For concreteness, say that output is determined by a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas 
production function, F(K,L)=AKβL1-β, where 0<β<1 measures capital’s share of output in the 
economy. Using the Cobb-Douglas formulation, after some re-arrangement (3) and (4) can 
be written as:
 K/L = [βA/(r(1+τ)]1/1-β (5)
 w = (1-β)A(K/L)β (6)
6where (1+τ)=(1-αt)/(1-t), and τ can be interpreted as the marginal effective tax rate (METR) 
on capital. Note that for α<1, which is the typical case, τ>0 and the METR increases with 
increases in the statutory CIT rate t. To close the model, assume for simplicity that labour is 
inelastically supplied (thus L in (5) and (6) is fixed),1 and note that in a small open economy 
with perfect capital mobility the net-of-tax cost of capital r is fixed by international markets. 
In this case, in equations (5) and (6), K/L is the equilibrium capital/labour ratio and w is the 
equilibrium wage rate.
Several observations will prove useful in the subsequent discussion. First, from (5) it 
is evident that K/L decreases as the METR on capital (τ) increases. This is because an 
increase in the tax on capital causes capital to move out of the small open economy to 
lower-taxed jurisdictions where it can earn the given net-of-tax return r. Moreover, from 
(6) we see that the equilibrium wage rate, w, is increasing in K/L. This is because as capital 
increases, labour becomes more productive, leading to an increase in the wage rate; of 
course, the opposite is true as well — the wage rate declines with K/L as capital leaves the 
economy due to a decline in the marginal productivity of labour. Thus, for the typical case 
where α<1, K/L declines in response to an increase in the CIT, the marginal productivity 
of labour is lowered, causing the wage rate to fall. It bears mentioning that the opposite is 
true for the case where capital is subsidized (α>1). Also, as Auerbach (2005) and Fuest et 
al., (2015) have pointed out, if the CIT constitutes a tax on pure profits, or economic rent, 
withα=1, an increase in the tax rate will impose no distortion on capital and would be borne 
entirely by shareholders.2 
This is clearly a very simple model; it is provided simply to emphasize the key transmission 
mechanism and to motivate our subsequent empirical analysis.3 While it is possible to 
expand the model to allow for imperfect capital mobility, some degree of labour mobility 
across jurisdictions and imperfect competition in the output market, etc.,4 the indirect 
channel through which the burden of CIT is thought to be transmitted to labour in a small 
open economy — by way of the capital/labour ratio — remains the same. Ultimately, it is 
an empirical matter as to how big that effect is. 
3.2. Empirical Specification
To begin, consider Figures 1-3. Figure 1 is a scatter plot of the capital/labour ratio (y-axis) 
against the combined federal/provincial CIT rate (x-axis) for all provinces from 1981 to 
2014, measured in logs. The plot shows a negative relationship between the two variables, 
which is consistent with the idea that higher corporate taxes are associated with lower 
1 This is for simplicity only; it is straightforward to allow for elastic labour supply.
2 Though it is possible in this case that labour will bear some of the burden by way of the direct 
transmission mechanism.
3 While we employ a Cobb-Douglas specification for concreteness, the basic results hold for any constant 
returns to scale production function. For the general case, equations (5) and (6) can be written as: 
FK(K,L)=r(1+τ) and FL(K,L)=w. If F(K,L) is homogenous of degree 1 in K and L (as under constant returns 
to scale), then FK and FL are homogenous of degree zero, which gives Fi(λK,λL)=Fi(K,L), for λ>0, i=K,L. 
Letting λ=1/L, this gives FK(K/L, 1)=r(1+τ) and FL(K/L,1)=w, which implicitly determine the equilibrium 
K/L ratio as a function of τ and the wage rate in turn as a function of K/L.
4 See Gravelle (2013).
7capital/labour ratios. The existence of distinct groups in the figure suggests the presence of 
province- and/or time-specific fixed effects that will need to be accounted for in subsequent 
estimations. Figure 2 plots average hourly wages (y-axis) against the capital/labour ratio 
(x-axis). We see the expected positive relationship and, again, some suggestion of the 
presence of fixed effects. Finally, Figure 3 plots the average hourly wage rate (y-axis) 
directly against the CIT rate; we see a negative correlation, which is consistent with the 
notion that higher corporate tax rates are associated with lower wages. Of course, these 
simple correlations do not imply causation, and to examine fully the effect of corporate 
income tax rates on wages it is necessary to undertake a more rigorous empirical 
investigation.
FIGURE 1  CAPITAL/LABOUR RATIOS VS. COMBINED FEDERAL/PROVINCIAL STATUTORY CIT RATES,  
ALL PROVINCES, 1981-2014
 
SOURCE: Statutory CIT Rates: Finances of the Nation, Canadian Tax Foundation, various issues. Capital: Aggregate Total Non-
residential Capital Stock (in 2007 dollars) , CANSIM 310-007 (capital ). Labour: Labour Force Survey, CANSIM 282-0002.
8FIGURE 2 AVERAGE HOURLY WAGES VS. CAPITAL/LABOUR RATIOS, ALL PROVINCES, 1981-2014
 
SOURCE: Average Hourly Earnings (all industries) Excluding Overtime: CANSIM 281-0008 and CANSIM 281-0030. 
Capital/Labour ratio: See Figure 1.
FIGURE 3  AVERAGE HOURLY WAGES VS. STATUTORY COMBINED FEDERAL /PROVINCIAL CIT RATES,  
ALL PROVINCES, 1981-2014
 
SOURCE: See Figures 1 and 2.
9Our empirical strategy, motivated by equations (5) and (6), and following in part Clausing 
(2013) and Hassett and Mathur (2015), involves the simultaneous estimation of the following 
two equations:
 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐾𝐾/𝐿𝐿)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼10 + 𝛼𝛼11 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼12𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (7)
 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑙𝑙𝑊𝑊)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼20 + 𝛼𝛼21 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐾𝐾/𝐿𝐿)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼22𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (8)
where log(K/L)it is the log of capital/labour ratio in province i in year t, log(CIT)it is the log 
of the combined provincial and federal statutory CIT rate, and log(Wage)it is the log of real 
hourly wage rate. X and Z are vectors of control variables that are thought to be important 
in explaining the capital/labour ratio and wage rate, respectively. This specification allows 
us to exploit both time-series and cross-sectional variation in wages and corporate taxes 
across provinces. As discussed above, provincial fixed effects, denoted by µi, are included 
to account for unmeasured time-invariant province-specific factors that may affect 
differences in wage rates and capital/labour ratios across the provinces; we also include 
time effects, θt, to control for common factors across provinces over time, such as business 
cycle conditions and other relevant policy changes at the national level. The corresponding 
error terms in the two equations are denoted by εit and uit. Our coefficients of interest are  
𝛼𝛼 11 and α21.
As is well known, fixed effects estimation can be seen as a generalization of the difference-
in-differences approach, extended to account for multiple treatment periods and groups (in 
our case provinces), and differing treatment intensities (in our case CIT rates). Identification 
is achieved by within group time variation (i.e., group specific changes over time); changes 
common to all groups are captured by the time fixed effects and are therefore not a source 
of variation in the identification of the treatment effects. As with differences-in-differences, 
the key underlying identification assumption is that, after controlling for other factors 
(captured in X and Z), the trend in the dependent variables (K/L and w) would be the same 
in all groups in the absence of the treatments. Our use of Canadian provincial panel data, 
perhaps arguably, renders this assumption more tenable than would be the case for cross 
country data.
According to the open-economy model of corporate tax incidence, we would expect the 
CIT to have a negative impact on the capital/labour ratio, and the capital/labour ratio to in 
turn have a positive impact on the wage rate; thus we would expect 𝛼𝛼 11<0 and α21>0. If this 
prediction holds, then we can compute the implied indirect effect of the CIT rate on wages 
using the estimated coefficients from the two equations as 𝛼𝛼 11*α21, which is the elasticity of 
the wage rate with respect to the CIT rate; we would expect 𝛼𝛼 11*α21<0. 
Our empirical methodology involves the simultaneous estimation of equations (7) and 
(8). This approach has two advantages. First, note that K/L is a dependent variable in 
equation (7) and an independent variable in equation (8). Ignoring the endogeneity of K/L in 
equation (8) can lead to biased estimates. Also, the error terms may be contemporaneously 
correlated, which means that we can gain efficiency by estimating the two equations jointly. 
Our key variable of interest in equation (7) is the corporate income tax rate (log(CIT)). 
Since the capital stock takes time to adjust, we expect tax rates to have lagged effects on 
capital accumulation. Ideally, we would like to use a distributed lag model by including 
both contemporaneous and lagged values of the tax rate as explanatory variables to shed 
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light on both the short-term and long-term effects of CIT on capital stock and wage rate. 
However, due to the presence of strong multicollinearity among the lagged values of the 
CIT rate, precise estimates of short-term effects of CIT on the wage rate cannot be obtained 
through such an approach, although this will not affect estimates of the tax rate’s long-
term effects. Thus, in our analysis, following both Clausing (2013) and Hassett and Mathur 
(2015), our measure of the tax rate is constructed as the average of the current and previous 
five years’ provincial and federal combined statutory corporate income tax.5 As Auerbach 
(2005) points out, such an approach also helps reduce the potential policy endogeneity of 
the corporate income tax rate. Because of the way the tax rate variable is constructed, the 
coefficient estimate can be interpreted as the long-term effect of the CIT rate on the capital/
labour ratio. Obviously, the choice of the lag length is ad hoc, although five-year lags are 
commonly used. Below, we undertake sensitivity tests to check our results’ robustness to 
the use of different lag lengths and alternative definition of tax rates.
As indicated above, previous studies suggest that capital is highly mobile across Canadian 
provincial borders. Capital accumulation in one province may therefore be influenced 
not only by the corporate income tax rate in that province but also by the tax rates of 
neighbouring provinces. Thus, following Hassett and Mathur (2015), we include the log 
of the weighted average (weighted by GDP) corporate income tax rate of other provinces 
(otherCIT) as an explanatory variable. This specification allows the CIT and otherCIT to 
have differential effects on capital accumulation. Note also that otherCIT is constructed in 
the same way as CIT; that is, it is the average of the current and previous five-year values 
of the variable. Other things remaining the same, an increase in other provinces’ tax rates 
should encourage capital to flow from high-tax provinces to low-tax provinces. Thus, we 
expect the coefficient on the log of otherCIT to be positive.
Capital accumulation may be thought to be higher in richer provinces than poorer ones. 
To account for this, following Clausing (2013), we include the contemporaneous value of 
the log of GDP per capita as an explanatory variable in the capital/labour ratio equation.6 
We expect the coefficient on the log of GDP per capita to be positive. Further, the business 
environment in a jurisdiction and the associated private investment can be influenced by the 
governing party’s ideological orientation. To control for the effect of ideology, we include a 
dummy variable that is equal to one if the provincial government belongs to the left-leaning 
New Democratic Party (NDP).7 We expect this variable to have a negative effect on the 
capital to labour ratio.
The dependent variable in Eq. (2), log(Wage)it, is based on the average annual hourly 
earnings (wage) for all workers in all industries. The nominal values are converted into 
real wages using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) (2007=100). As workers working 
5 As far as long-term effects of the tax rate are concerned, this approach is equivalent to using a distributed 
lag model with equal weights.
6 If capital accumulates from domestic savings, an argument may be made for using lagged rather than 
contemporaneous GDP in this regard. The use of contemporaneous GDP is consistent with the small open 
economy setting whereby there is no correlation between domestic capital accumulation and savings, 
which finds empirical support for Canadian provinces in Helliwell and McKitrick (1999) and Vaillancourt 
and Gouëdard (2011).
7 Following the common classification in the related literature, the Parti Québécois in Quebec and the 
Saskatchewan Party in Saskatchewan are categorized as NDP and Conservative, respectively.
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overtime usually command higher wage rates, including overtime payments may distort 
the workers’ actual hourly earnings. Thus, we exclude overtime payments from the hourly 
earnings. However, as part of the sensitivity analysis, we later check the robustness of our 
results to the inclusion of overtime payments. Ideally, as in Ebrahimi and Vaillancourt 
(2016), we would like to use the wage rate of workers employed in the private sector as 
our dependent variable. However, these data are not available at the aggregate level for 
Canadian provinces. Therefore, our wage rate data include the wages of those workers who 
work both in the private and public sectors. If higher corporate income tax revenue enables 
governments to raise wage payments for public sector workers, our CIT rate coefficient 
estimate may be biased. To address this, we include average real monthly wages and 
salaries per worker in the public sector (public wages) as an additional control variable. We 
expect the coefficient on the log of public wages to be positive in the wage rate regression.
In our basic wage rate regressions, we control for other variables that are generally thought 
to have effects on wage rate and labour market outcomes. As is common in the related 
literature (see Carroll (2009)), we include the share of workers who are unionized (union) 
as a control variable in the wage regression. As discussed above, unionized workers may 
be able to obtain higher wages and benefits through their collective bargaining power. This 
in part controls for the direct transmission mechanism discussed above, and is consistent 
with our focus on the indirect effect. We expect the coefficient on the union variable to be 
positive in the wage rate regression. 
Higher education is often associated with higher wages. Thus, as in Carroll (2009), we also 
include the share of the population with a university degree (university) as an explanatory 
variable in the wage rate regression. If higher education increases labour productivity and 
raises wage rates, we expect the coefficient on log of university to be positive. 
Personal income taxes may also affect the wages workers receive. To the extent that labour 
supply is not perfectly inelastic, or labour demand perfectly elastic, some of the burden of 
personal income taxes will fall on employers, and be reflected in the gross of tax wage rate. 
As such, we include the log of provincial and federal combined average effective personal 
income tax rate as a co-variate in the wage equation.8 We expect this variable to have a 
positive effect on gross-of-personal tax wages. 
In addition, to control for labour market conditions, we include the log of current 
unemployment rate and the average labour growth rate.9 As in Clausing (2013), we use 
the average growth rate of labour over the previous five years to capture labour market 
conditions. We also use the average growth rate of the economy over the previous five years 
(Average GDP growth) to account for the effect of macroeconomic conditions on wage 
rate. Again, this approach should reduce potential endogeneity problems with the relevant 
variables.
8 As is common in the literature, this variable is obtained by dividing total provincial and federal personal 
income tax revenue by total provincial taxable income.
9 Labour growth is the growth rate of the total number of people in the labour force.
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3.3. Data
We employ annual panel data from the 10 Canadian provinces over the period 1981 to 2014. 
The statutory top CIT rates were obtained from various issues of Finances of the Nation 
(formerly National Finances) published by the Canadian Tax Foundation. The data on all 
other variables in our analysis are obtained from Statistics Canada’s database (CANSIM). 
Table A1 in the appendix provides the definitions and sources of data for the different 
variables in more detail.
Table 1 provides information on our key variables of interest, the hourly wage rate and 
statutory CIT rates, for all provinces. To shed some light on the evolution of these key 
variables, we present the values at the initial, middle and final years of the sample period. 
We also present mean values of the variables over the whole sample period. 
The average real hourly wage rate for all the provinces during the sample period was 
about C$17.53. Note that there is considerable variation in the mean hourly wage rate, 
ranging from C$14.26 for Prince Edward Island to C$20.27 for Alberta. During the period 
under consideration, the combined provincial and federal statutory corporate income tax 
rate averaged about 41.26 per cent. As Table 1 shows, there is significant variation in the 
corporate income tax rate across provinces. The period’s average combined provincial and 
federal CIT rate ranges from 36.06 per cent in Quebec to about 42.88 per cent in Nova 
Scotia. There is also considerable variation in the statutory corporate income tax rates 
across provinces during the period, varying from 8.86 per cent in Quebec to 15.68 per cent 
in Nova Scotia. There has been generally a downward trend in the statutory provincial and 
federal combined corporate income tax rate due mainly to the reductions in the federal CIT 
rate over the sample period. Table 2 provides descriptive summary statistics of the other 
variables used in the empirical analysis.
TABLE 1 PROFILE OF CANADIAN PROVINCES, 1981-2014
NFL PEI NS NB QB ON MB SK AB BC
Hourly Wage Rate (2007 dollars)
1981 17.96 12.40 18.07 18.50 18.64 20.98 18.20 22.95 24.83 25.89
1988 14.42 12.37 15.69 15.11 16.74 17.81 16.43 16.56 18.28 19.27
2014 20.03 16.49 18.06 18.06 19.79 19.64 18.88 21.04 22.78 20.97
1981-2014 16.61 14.26 16.41 16.38 17.61 18.86 17.08 18.00 20.27 19.77
Provincial statutory CIT rate (%)
1981 15.00 10.00 13.00 14.00 13.00 14.00 15.00 14.00 11.00 16.00
1988 16.00 15.00 15.00 16.00 5.90 15.50 17.00 17.00 14.01 14.00
2014 14.00 16.00 16.00 12.00 11.90 11.50 12.00 12.00 10.00 11.00
1981-2014 14.90 14.65 15.68 14.53 8.86 14.37 15.47 15.26 12.66 14.22
Provincial and federal combined statutory CIT rate (%)
1981 52.80 47.80 50.80 51.80 50.80 51.80 52.80 51.80 48.80 53.80
1988 48.45 47.45 47.45 48.45 38.35 47.95 49.45 49.45 46.46 46.45
2014 29.00 31.00 31.00 27.00 26.90 26.50 27.00 27.00 25.00 26.00
1981-2014 42.10 41.85 42.88 41.73 36.06 41.57 42.67 42.47 39.86 41.42
SOURCE: Table A1; authors’ calculations.
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TABLE 2 SUMMARY STATISTICS
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
 Hourly wage rate, 2007 dollars 17.526 2.265 12.113 26.649
 Provincial statutory CIT rate 0.141 0.027 0.055 0.170
 Combined statutory CIT rate (CIT)a 0.428 0.069 0.264 0.532
 Log(CIT)a -0.905 0.205 -1.386 -0.601
 Log(ATR)a -1.192 0.200 -1.679 -0.464
 Log(OtherCIT)a -2.032 0.070 -2.184 -1.843
 Log(wage) 2.855 0.129 2.494 3.283
 Log(K/L) 11.462 0.369 10.818 12.573
 Average labour growth rateb 0.014 0.010 -0.014 0.067
 Average GDP growth rateb 0.026 0.015 -0.010 0.096
 Log(GDP per capita) 10.588 0.309 9.933 11.469
 Log(unemployment) -2.408 0.391 -3.352 -1.599
 Log(university) -2.301 0.413 -3.440 -1.469
 Log(union) 3.483 0.190 3.011 4.054
 Log(openness) 0.089 0.161 -0.246 0.624
 Log(public wages) 37.581 3.223 31.576 49.211
NDP government 0.221 0.415 0.000 1.000
Log(PIT) -1.488 0.138 -1.756 -1.028
Note: The total number of observations is 340.
a These variables are obtained as the averages of the current year and previous five years.
b These variables are obtained as the averages of the previous five years.
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
4.1. Empirical Results
Table 3 presents the empirical results. Note again that we estimate the models including 
provincial fixed effects to account for unobserved province-specific factors that can 
influence the capital/labour ratio and wages, and year-specific dummies to capture the 
effects of shocks that are common to all provinces. We focus our discussion on the 
coefficients on the main variables of interest.
TABLE 3 REGRESSIONS EXPLAINING LOG(K/L) AND LOG(WAGE), 1981-2014
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS SUR 3SLS 3SLS 3SLS
Dependent variable: Log(K/L)
Log(CIT) -0.436*** -0.355*** -0.233**
(0.121) (0.112) (0.110)
Log(ATR) -0.069**
(0.028)
Log(METR) -0.116***
(0.033)
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Log(Other CIT) -0.006 0.058 0.134 0.155 0.594**
(0.231) (0.213) (0.205) (0.133) (0.255)
Log(GDP per capita) 0.584*** 0.622*** 0.639*** 0.625*** 0.510***
(0.055) (0.051) (0.050) (0.051) (0.105)
NDP government -0.012 -0.016* -0.020** -0.023*** -0.057***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011)
 Dependent variable: Log(Wage)
Log(K/L) 0.245*** 0.303*** 0.461*** 0.645*** 0.320***
(0.034) (0.031) (0.043) (0.050) (0.116)
Log(PIT) 0.269*** 0.267*** 0.257*** 0.228*** 0.004
(0.053) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.038)
Average labour growth 1.133** 1.066*** 0.937** 0.838** 0.660
(0.450) (0.410) (0.406) (0.400) (0.453)
Average GDP growth 0.577** 0.479* 0.484* 0.415* 0.334*
(0.270) (0.247) (0.250) (0.251) (0.187)
Log(unemployment) 0.084*** 0.083*** 0.084*** 0.082*** -0.024
(0.020) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.015)
Log(university) 0.184*** 0.168*** 0.131*** 0.095** 0.039
(0.041) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.052)
Log(union) 0.029 0.043 0.052 0.054 -0.077
(0.038) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.095)
Log(openness) -0.028 -0.037 -0.057 -0.079** -0.008
(0.039) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.053)
Log(public wages) 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.007*** -0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Implied effects of tax rate -0.107** -0.108** -0.107** -0.045** -0.037**
(0.033) (0.035) (0.050) (0.018) (0.015)
Observations 340 340 340 340 130
R2 0.976;0.919 0.976;0.918 0.976;0.905 0.976;0.872 0.993;0.978
Note: All regressions include province-specific fixed effects and year effects. Implied effects of the tax rate are the 
elasticity of hourly wage rate with respect to the corporate income tax rate (through its effects on K/L ratio). Standard 
errors in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by *** for one per cent, ** for five per cent, and * for 10 per cent.
 
In column 1 of Table 3 we estimate equations (7) and (8) separately by simple OLS, which 
does not take simultaneity into account. The coefficient on log(CIT) in the capital/labour 
ratio equation is negative and statistically significant at the one per cent level. Further, the 
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coefficient on log(K/L) in the wage rate equation is positive and statistically significant 
at the one per cent level. Taken together, this is consistent with the prediction of the open 
economy general equilibrium model of indirect corporate income tax incidence. We 
compute the indirect effect of the corporate income tax rate on wages (through its effects 
on capital stock) using the estimated coefficient on log(CIT ) in the K/L equation and the 
estimated coefficient on log(K/L) in the wage rate regression. The product of these two 
coefficients is the implied effect of the corporate income tax rate on wages. Table 3 presents 
this estimate in the second to last row. This is our estimate of the elasticity of the real 
hourly wage rate with respect to the corporate income tax rate. The estimated elasticity 
of -0.107 is statistically significant at the one per cent level. It suggests that a one per cent 
increase in the corporate income tax rate is associated with a 0.107 per cent reduction in 
hourly wage rate. 
As discussed above, the estimation of the two equations separately by OLS as reported in 
column (1) may not be appropriate, for two reasons. First, log(K/L) is a dependent variable 
in the capital/labour regression and is included as an exogenous independent variable in 
the wage regression. This means that the coefficient estimates may be biased. Secondly, the 
error terms in the two equations may be correlated.
With regard to the latter, the Breusch-Pagan test rejects the null of independence of 
residuals from the capital/labour ratio and the hourly wage rate equation at the five per 
cent level. Thus, we can gain efficiency by estimating the two equations jointly using the 
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) method, as the error terms in the two equations are 
contemporaneously correlated. Joint estimation of the two equations will also help us obtain 
a more precise estimate of the wage rate’s elasticity with respect to the corporate income 
tax rate. Column (2) of Table 3 presents coefficient estimates based on the SUR estimation 
method. The coefficient on log(CIT) remains negative and statistically significant at the 
one per cent level in the capital/labour ratio regression, and log(K/L) remains positive 
and significant at the one per cent level in the wage rate regression. The implied effect 
of corporate income tax rate on wages is negative and statistically significant, and the 
elasticity remains just under -0.11. 
So far, our analysis treats the log(K/L) in the wage regression as exogenous. However, as 
discussed above, since this is a dependent-variable first equation, this assumption may not 
be appropriate and can lead to biased results. To address this, we estimate equations (1) and 
(2) jointly by three-stage least squares (3SLS), which treats the K/L ratio as endogenous 
and combines two-stage least squares with SUR (see Wooldridge 2002). This methodology 
is feasible because the two equations are over-identified. The results are given in column 
(3). This is our preferred specification. The coefficient on log(CIT) is, as expected, negative 
and statistically significant in the capital/labour ratio equation. Note that the coefficient on 
the log (K/L) in the wage equation is now higher than the OLS result in column (1), and 
the SUR results in columns (2). This suggests that these estimates are biased downward, 
underestimating the impact of the capital/labour ratio on the wage rate. 
The estimates in column (3) indicate that the elasticity of the capital/labour ratio with 
respect to the CIT rate is -0.233, and that a one per cent increase in the CIT rate is 
associated with a 0.233 per cent decline in the capital/labour ratio. The coefficient on 
log(K/L) is also positive and statistically significant in the wage rate equation. In this case, 
the coefficient is now relatively higher, suggesting that not taking the endogeneity of the 
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variable biases the coefficient estimate downwards. The estimated elasticity is 0.46, which 
means that a one per cent increase in the capital/labour ratio is associated with a 0.46 per 
cent increase in the wage rate. The net result is an estimate of the elasticity of the real wage 
rate with respect to the corporate income tax rate of -0.107, which is statistically significant 
at the five per cent level.
The foregoing analysis employs the statutory corporate income tax rate to capture the 
effects of the corporate income tax system. However, as shown in the simple model 
developed earlier, due to the presence of various tax credits and deductions, the tax burden 
corporations face may diverge from the statutory tax rate. For this reason, some previous 
studies, such as Carroll (2009) and Hassett and Mathur (2015), also use average and 
marginal effective tax rates as alternative tax measures of corporate taxes. Thus, we use the 
average effective tax rate (ATR) and marginal effective tax rate (METR) in columns (4) and 
(5), respectively. 
The average effective tax rate (ATR) is computed as a ratio of the corporate income 
tax revenue that governments collect to a measure of the corporate tax base. Generally, 
obtaining an appropriate corporate tax base dataset is difficult and researchers often employ 
some form of proxy for the corporate income tax base.10 Fortunately, we were able to obtain 
administrative data from Finance Canada that give the corporate income tax base and tax 
revenue of all provinces for most of the period under consideration. The federal government 
uses these revenue and tax base data in its computation and allocation of equalization 
grants. Thus, in column (4) we use the average effective tax rate (ATR) — which is 
computed as the ratio of corporate income tax revenue to corporate income tax base — 
instead of the statutory corporate income tax rate. The ATR is constructed as the average of 
the current and previous five years, as we have done for the statutory rate (CIT). The results 
in column (4) show that, as expected, ATR has a negative and significant effect on log(K/L), 
although in absolute value the numerical magnitude is lower. The estimated implied effect 
of the ATR on hourly wages is -0.045 and it is statistically significant at the five per cent 
level. The results suggest that a one per cent increase in the ATR is associated with a 0.045 
per cent decrease in the real hourly wage rate. 
In column (5), we use the marginal effective tax rate (METR) as a measure of the effects of 
the corporate income tax system on hourly wages. Long time-series provincial data on the 
METR are not available. We use aggregate METR estimates from Chen and Mintz (2006, 
2012) which are available only for the period 1997 to 2012. This substantially reduces the 
number of observations available for estimation. The key variable in column (5) is the log of 
METR. We also include the weighted average METR of other provinces (weighted by GDP) 
as an additional explanatory variable. Note that to minimize the potential endogeneity 
problem associated with the tax rate, we use five-year lag values of both the log of METR 
and the log of the weighted average METR of other provinces.11 The results indicate that 
corporate income tax as measured by the METR has a negative and statistically significant 
effect on the capital/labour ratio, which in turn has a statistically significant positive effect 
10 For example, Carroll (2009) uses the corporate income tax revenue to personal income ratio as average tax 
rate. However, Clausing (2013) and other later studies criticize the use of personal income as a proxy for 
corporate income tax base.
11 Note that the method of constructing the METR variable is different from that used for statutory tax rates 
and ATR, dictated by the very limited number of observations for the variable.
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on hourly wages. The estimated implied elasticity of the METR on hourly wages is -0.037 
and is statistically significant at the five per cent level, and again is lower than the estimates 
using the statutory CIT rate. 
While the coefficients on the ATR and METR variables are negative and statistically 
significant — providing additional support for the indirect transmission mechanism of 
corporate taxes to wages — the estimated elasticities are lower than we obtain using the 
statutory CIT rate. This may be the case for a number of reasons. Statutory tax rate changes 
happen less frequently and when they occur, it is because of the government’s explicit 
policy choice. On the other hand, effective tax rates can change even if there are no tax 
policy changes. For instance, changes in economic conditions that affect corporations’ 
profits can result in changes in the ATR without any change in policy. The computation of 
METR requires various assumptions such as the type of investment, economic depreciation 
rates, discount rates, etc., all of which can change with economic conditions. There may 
therefore be some endogeneity issues associated with the use of these tax variables. Also, 
as indicated above, we have a very limited number of METR observations. Nonetheless, the 
results do provide additional empirical support to the open economy general equilibrium 
model of corporate income tax incidence using Canadian provincial data. Thus, regardless 
of the measure of corporate income rate employed in the analysis, the results suggest that 
corporate income taxes have a statistically significant negative effect on hourly wages and 
that some of the burden of the corporate tax falls on workers. 
It may also be noted that the estimated coefficients on the control variables are generally 
consistent with our expectations. For example, in the K/L regression, the coefficient on 
log(GDP per capita) is positive and significant. Also noteworthy is the negative coefficient 
on the dummy variable for the presence of NDP governments, which is statistically 
significant. In the wage regressions, the average personal income tax rate variables are 
positive and significant, as expected. Moreover, the coefficients on labour growth, the 
unemployment rate, GDP growth, university enrolment and public sector wages are all the 
expected sign and statistically significant.
How do our results compare with those of earlier studies? As indicated previously, we use 
an empirical methodology similar to Clausing (2013). Unlike Clausing (2013), however, we 
find a statistically significant negative relationship between the corporate income tax rate 
and wages. Our results are also qualitatively robust to the use of alternative measures of 
corporate income tax rate. Our estimates of the elasticity of hourly wages with respect to 
the statutory corporate income tax rate are lower (in absolute value) than those of Hassett 
and Mathur (2006, 2015) and Felix (2007), but relatively close to the estimates of Carroll 
(2009) and Felix (2009). Notably, our elasticity estimates are also similar to Ebrahimi and 
Vaillancourt (2016), who also employ Canadian data.
It bears mentioning that our estimates might be considered a lower bound of the elasticity 
of wages with respect the CIT rate as we isolate the indirect effect by way of the K/L ratio, 
and do not account for any direct effects associated with wage bargaining over rents.
4.2. Corporate Tax Incidence Computations
What do our results imply about the corporate income tax incidence on wages? Following 
the common practice in the literature, we measure the burden borne by labour by computing 
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the reduction in aggregate wages associated with a $1 increase in provincial CIT revenue 
(through an increase in the provincial statutory rate). We compute the corporate income 
tax incidence on wages for all 10 provinces for the year 2014, which is the last year of our 
sample period. The computations are based on the estimated wage elasticity with respect 
to the corporate income tax rate reported in column (3) of Table 3. We also use provincial 
corporate income tax revenue, total wage income in the private sector, and provincial and 
federal statutory CIT rates for 2014 in our calculations. Table 4 shows the results.
Previous studies tend to assume that the corporate tax base remains constant when the tax 
rate changes to calculate the corporate income tax incidence on wages. In order to compare 
our results to these studies, we begin by making a similar assumption in our computations, 
shown in column (1) in Table 4. For instance, for Alberta, total provincial corporate income 
tax revenue in 2014 was about C$5.8 billion. Thus, a 10 per cent increase in the provincial 
statutory corporate income tax rate, assuming that the tax base remains constant, leads 
to an increase in provincial corporate income tax revenue of C$0.58 billion. In the same 
year, total wage income in the private sector for the province was about C$130.1 billion. 
Given our elasticity estimate of -0.107 in column (3) of Table 3, a 10 per cent increase in 
the provincial statutory CIT rate, assuming that there is no impact on employment, leads to 
a decrease in aggregate wages in the private sector of about C$0.557 billion.12 This means 
that for each dollar of incremental corporate income tax revenue that the province collects 
due to an increase in its CIT rate, aggregate wages in the province fall by about 96 cents. 
TABLE 4 CORPORATE INCOME TAX INCIDENCE ON WAGES (IN CANADIAN DOLLARS), 2014
Province Constant CIT Basea Responsive CIT Baseb
 British Columbia 1.34 2.25
 Alberta 0.96 1.52
 Saskatchewan 1.12 2.01
 Manitoba 1.52 2.72
 Ontario 1.14 1.97
 Quebec 0.98 1.74
 New Brunswick 1.74 3.12
 Nova Scotia 1.18 2.86
 Prince Edward Island 1.59 3.85
 Newfoundland and Labrador 0.95 1.95
SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on the estimated wage elasticity with respect to the statutory corporate income 
tax rate (column (3) of Table (3)) and provincial corporate income tax revenue and wage income data for 2014. The 
figures show the dollar amount by which wages decrease due to a $1 increase in corporate income tax liability. 
a Assumes the CIT base remains constant in response to an increase in the tax rate.
b Assumes the CIT base shrinks in response to an increase in the tax rate. Uses semi-elasticity estimates from Dahlby and 
Ferede (2012) to calculate the shrinkage in the tax base.
 
We do computations for other provinces in a similar fashion. Note that since we use the 
same wage elasticity estimate for all provinces, the variation in the computed corporate 
12 For 2014, Alberta’s and the federal government’s statutory CIT rates were 10 per cent and 15 per cent, 
respectively. Given our implied wage elasticity with respect to the CIT rate estimate of -0.107 and 
provincial total wages in the private sector of C$130.1 billion, the effect of a 10 per cent increase in the 
provincial CIT rate on wages is simply computed as: .
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income tax incidence on wages across provinces is due to differences in the provincial 
statutory CIT rate, total provincial corporate tax revenue and total wage payments in the 
private sector. The results in column (1) show that for a $1 increase in provincial corporate 
tax revenue through an increase in the provincial statutory CIT rate, the associated decrease 
in aggregate wages ranges from a low of 95 cents for Newfoundland and Labrador to a high 
of C$1.74 for New Brunswick.13 This shows that there is a significant variation in the effects 
of CIT on wages across the Canadian provinces. 
How do these estimates compare with previous studies? For U.S. states, Felix (2009) and 
Carroll (2009) estimate the burden borne by labour of a $1 increase in corporate tax liability 
to be between $1.40-$3.60 and $2.50, respectively. Using cross-section data, Hassett and 
Mathur (2006) estimate the burden borne by labour to be between $22 and $26, which 
may be considered unreasonably high. Their more recent estimate, however, indicates 
that labour’s burden is about $13. On the other end of the spectrum, Liu and Altshuler 
(2013) estimate the burden borne by labour to be 60 cents. As such, our computations are 
generally in line with previous studies.
As indicated above, to make our calculations comparable to previous studies the 
calculations in column (1) in Table 4 presume that the corporate tax base does not change 
in response to the increased tax rate. We do not think that this is a reasonable assumption. 
Dahlby and Ferede (2012) examine the sensitivity of the corporate income tax base to 
changes in provincial CIT rates. They estimate that, on average, a one percentage point 
increase in a provincial CIT rate causes the corporate tax base to shrink by 3.67 per cent 
in the short term, and 13.60 per cent in the long term. This means that an increase in a 
provincial CIT rate will raise less revenue than presumed in the previous computations, 
understating the impact of a $1 increase in corporate taxes on labour. To account for this, 
and in an innovation relative to previous approaches, we proceed as follows. Let τp and 
τf denote the provincial and federal CIT rates, respectively. As above, the product α11* 
α21 is the implied wage elasticity with respect to the CIT rate; let εcc denote the CIT base 
semi-elasticity with respect to τp. The effect of a one-dollar increase in the CIT revenue 
(through a change in τp) on wages accounting for the shrinkage in the CIT base can then be 
computed as:
 
(𝛼𝛼11∗𝛼𝛼21)∗(
𝜏𝜏𝑝𝑝
𝜏𝜏𝑝𝑝+𝜏𝜏𝑓𝑓
)
⌊1+𝜏𝜏𝑝𝑝∗𝜀𝜀𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐⌋
∗ (
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊
 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇 𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊
) = (𝛼𝛼11 ∗ 𝛼𝛼21) ∗ (
𝜏𝜏𝑝𝑝
𝜏𝜏𝑝𝑝+𝜏𝜏𝑓𝑓
) ∗ (
 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊
 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇 𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊
) ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝  (9)
where MCFp is the Marginal Cost of Public Funds for the CIT in province p..
13 Note that in our panel regression analysis we control for other provinces’ weighted average provincial CIT 
rate. Thus, our wage elasticity estimates (with respect to CIT rate) and all associated computations should 
be interpreted as the effect of an increase in the CIT rate by a province while all other provinces keep their 
CIT rates constant.
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In column 2 of Table 4, we take the shrinkage in the corporate tax base into account, using 
the semi-elasticity and associated MCF estimates in Dahlby and Ferede (2012).14 From 
column (2), which uses our elasticity estimates based on the statutory CIT rate, we see that 
the burden of the tax on labour is higher, ranging from C$1.52 for Alberta to C$3.85 for 
Prince Edward Island. Note that the change in the provinces’ ranking occurs because the 
computation is sensitive to the statutory CIT rate; provinces with a lower CIT rate tend to 
have lower incidence on wages.15
4.3. Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis
Our calculations of the corporate income tax incidence on wages depend crucially on wage 
elasticity estimates. In this section, we conduct various robustness checks to investigate 
the sensitivity of our estimates. We analyze the robustness of our results to the choice of 
various lag lengths, the use of total capital stock instead of non-residential capital stock, 
to the inclusion of overtime payments in hourly wages, and to the inclusion of the relative 
price of capital as an additional control variable in the capital regression. Table 5 reports the 
results of the robustness checks. For the sake of brevity, we present only the coefficients of 
our variables of interest under the 3SLS specification. That is, we report the coefficient on 
log(CIT) in the capital regression (𝛼𝛼 11) in column (1), the coefficient on log(K/L) in the wage 
rate regression (α21) in column (2), and the implied effects of log(CIT) on hourly wage rate  
(𝛼𝛼 11*α21) in column (3).
14 When a province raises its CIT rate (given the federal and other provinces’ CIT rate), the tax base shrinks. 
This shrinkage in the tax base adversely affects the revenue that both the federal and the provincial 
governments collect in the province. The shrinkage of the tax base can be partly due to the mobility of 
the base to another jurisdiction. If the tax base shrinks due to the mobility of the base to another province, 
the fall in the federal government revenue in the tax-raising province may be compensated by the increase 
in the federal revenue from the other province (the province to which the base moves). Therefore, in our 
analysis, we assume that the increase in the provincial statutory CIT rate will not affect the federal CIT 
revenue.
15 It bears mentioning that our estimates and calculations might be considered a lower bound for the impact 
of the CIT on wages as they isolate the indirect effect and do not account for any direct effects.
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TABLE 5 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS (3SLS)
Robustness check
(1) (2) (3)
Coefficient on CIT rate  
(K/L Regression)
Coefficient on K/L  
(Wage Rate Regression)
Implied effects of  
CIT on wage rate
1 Average CIT rate of previous 4 years
-0.240** 0.456*** -0.110***
(0.105) (0.043) (0.048)
2 Average CIT rate of previous 3 years
-0.244** 0.455*** -0.111**
(0.102) (0.043) (0.046)
3 Five-year effects of CITa
-0.265** 0.431*** -0.114**
(0.115) (0.042) (0.050)
4 Four-year effects of CITa
-0.263** 0.434*** -0.114**
(0.110) (0.043) (0.048)
5 Three-year effects of CITa
-0.262** 0.442*** -0.116**
(0.105) (0.043) (0.047)
6 Using total capital stock
-0.174*** 0.861*** -0.150***
(0.062) (0.103) (0.054)
7 Including overtime
-0.240** 0.477*** -0.114**
(0.110) (0.043) (0.052)
8 Including relative price of capital
-0.245** 0.464*** -0.114**
(0.111) (0.043) (0.051)
9b
Provincial CIT
-0.121***
0.429***
-0.052***
(0.026) (0.014)
Federal CIT
-0.092***
(0.071)
-0.040***
(0.030) (0.015)
Note: The robustness checks are based on our preferred regression of column (3) of Table 3. Standard errors in 
parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by *** for one per cent, ** for five per cent, and * for 10 per cent. All 
regressions include fixed provincial and year effects. 
a The coefficients on the CIT rate are obtained by summing the coefficient estimates of the contemporaneous tax rate 
and all relevant lagged values of the tax rate that are included as explanatory variables. 
b This regression does not include year effects since the federal CIT rate changes only over time. 
As previously indicated, we use the average statutory CIT rate of the current and previous 
five years as our key tax variable. Although this approach can help minimize the potential 
endogeneity problem of the tax rate and address the expected lagged effects of tax rate 
changes on the capital stock, the choice of a five-year lag is ad hoc. In our sensitivity 
analysis, we experiment with alternative lag lengths for the tax rate. More specifically, we 
use: the average of the current and previous four years of the CIT rate (row (1)), the average 
of current and previous three years of the CIT rate (row (2)), contemporaneous and up to 
five-year lagged tax rates separately (row (3)), up to four-year lagged tax rates (row (4)), and 
up to three-year lagged tax rates (row (5)). In all cases, we find that the corporate income 
tax rate continues to have a statistically significant effect on wages through its adverse 
effect on the capital/labour ratio, suggesting that the results are robust to these changes. 
Arguably, the capital stock most influenced by the corporate income tax is the non-
residential capital stock (see Parsons (2008)). However, some studies, such as Clausing 
(2013), use the total capital stock. Consequently, as part of our sensitivity analysis, we use 
the total capital stock to labour ratio in row (6). All the other variables are as defined and 
used in column (4) of Table 3. Compared to our preferred regression result, the effect of the 
CIT rate on the capital/labour ratio is lower in absolute value and the effect of the capital/
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labour ratio on the wage rate is higher. The net result of this is that the elasticity of the 
hourly wage rate with respect to the CIT rate is slightly higher in absolute value compared 
to our preferred result. 
In row (7), we use the hourly wage rate including overtime payments. Again, our main 
results remain largely unaffected, although the numerical magnitudes of the coefficient 
estimates are now slightly higher. Finally, we include the log of the relative price of capital 
as an additional explanatory variable in our regression. Although our dependent variable 
is the real capital/labour ratio, some previous studies that focus on the estimation of the 
elasticity of the user cost of capital, such as Schaller (2006) and Parsons (2008), include 
the relative price of capital in their analysis. Thus in row (8), we control for the log of 
the relative price of capital — defined as the ratio of the implicit price index of gross 
fixed capital formation to the implicit price index of GDP. Again, our main result that the 
corporate income tax rate and wages are negatively related through the adverse effect of the 
former on capital/labour ratio is robust.
Finally, in row (9), we include the provincial and federal CIT rates separately as explanatory 
variables. Since the federal CIT rate changes only over time, it is not possible to control for 
year effects in this regression. Nonetheless, the results show that both provincial and federal 
CIT rates have adverse effects on wages. The effect of the provincial CIT rate on wages is 
larger in absolute value. This is expected, as we would expect capital to be more mobile 
across provincial borders than internationally.16 
In sum, although the magnitudes of the coefficient estimates vary, our results are generally 
robust to various sensitivity checks. Our results indicate that higher corporate income tax 
reduces capital accumulation and the resulting reduction in the capital/labour ratio in turn 
reduces workers’ productivity and their hourly wages. The implication of this is that part of 
the corporate income tax burden falls on workers in the form of lower wages.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Corporate income tax incidence is one of the more contentious issues in tax policy 
discussions. Since corporations are merely conduits through which income passes to 
individuals, it is not clear who ultimately bears the burden of corporate taxes. The issue has 
important implications for the overall fairness of the tax system and determination of the 
distribution of tax burdens across different factors, owners and income groups. 
In this paper, we conduct an empirical investigation of the impact of corporate taxes on 
wages using panel data for Canadian provinces from 1981 to 2014. The theoretical basis for 
our empirical analysis is the general equilibrium open-economy model of corporate income 
tax incidence, which emphasizes the indirect channel to wages by way of the capital/labour 
ratio. As such, we estimate wage and capital/labour ratio equations simultaneously. Our 
empirical results indicate that the CIT rate adversely affects the capital/labour ratio, which 
in turn reduces wages; the implied elasticity of the average hourly wage rate with respect 
to the statutory CIT rate is -0.107. The results are robust to various sensitivity checks and 
within the range of values obtained in previous similar studies. 
16 In principle, this could be offset to some extent by a higher degree of labour mobility among provinces.
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We use the empirical estimates to compute the corporate income tax incidence for all the 
provinces for year 2014. Under the standard assumption in the literature which ignores the 
shrinkage in the CIT base, our computations suggest that for a $1 increase in corporate tax 
revenue due to an increase in the provincial CIT rate, the associated decrease in aggregate 
wages ranges from 95 cents for Newfoundland and Labrador to C$1.74 for New Brunswick. 
When we take the shrinkage in the CIT base into account, the amount borne by labour is 
higher, ranging from C$1.52 for Alberta to C$3.85 for Prince Edward Island. 
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APPENDIX
TABLE A1 DATA APPENDIX
Variables Definitions Sources
CIT Provincial and federal combined top statutory corporate income tax rate Finances of the Nation (various issues)
ATR
Effective average corporate income tax rate (ATR). It is  
calculated as provincial corporate income tax revenue divided 
by corporate income tax base
Finance Canada [Corporate tax revenue and base data used for 
allocation of equalization grants (1976-2008)] and provincial 
public accounts (2009-2014)1
Wage Average hourly earnings (all industries) excluding overtime CANSIM 281-0008 and CANSIM 281-0030
Other CIT Weighted average (weighted by GDP) CIT rate of  other provinces
Finances of the Nation (CIT)
and CANSIM 384-0038 (GDP)
(K/L) Aggregate total non-residential capital stock (in 2007 dollars) to labour ratio
CANSIM 310-007 (capital ) and
CANSIM 282-0002 (labour)
Average labour growth The average growth rate of labour over the previous five years CANSIM 282-0002 (labour)
Average GDP growth The average growth rate of real GDP over the previous  five years CANSIM 384-0038 (real GDP)
GDP per capita Provincial GDP per capita (in 2007 dollars) CANSIM 384-0038 (real GDP) and CANSIM 51-0001  (population)
Unemployment Provincial unemployment rate CANSIM 282-0002 
Union The share of workers who are unionized CANSIM 279-0025 (1976-1995) and CANSIM 282-0220 (1997-2014)2
Openness Provincial trade to GDP ratio CANSIM 384-0038
Public wages
Average monthly wages & salaries for workers in the public 
sector. It is obtained by dividing monthly wages and salaries  
in the public sector by public sector employment
CANSIM 183-0002 (1981-2012)3
University The share of the population with a university degree Census data (1981, 1986, & 1991)
4 
and CANSIM 282-0209 (for 1990-2014)
Note: The nominal wages are converted into real using CPI (2007=100) (CANSIM 326-0021).
1. The CIT base for 2009-2014 is obtained through extrapolation using the growth rate of corporate net operating 
surplus data (CANSIM 584-0037). 
2. The two data series may not be directly comparable. However, the trends are similar.
3. The series is updated for 2013 and 2014 using the growth rate of total compensation per hour for the government 
sector (CANSIM 383-0030).
4. Data between census years are based on extrapolation assuming a constant growth rate.
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